**INTRINSICALLY SCARCE GOODS**

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*Abstract.* We are concerned with a class of goods that are both scarce and valued for experiences that depend on their authenticity and unmediated access to them. Such goods include prehistoric cave paintings, spectacular natural sites, and several of the arts. Because these goods are scarce, access to them must be restricted if they are to survive. After characterizing the goods we have in mind, we will propose a scheme for distributing access to them. Finally, we will suggest that the lessons learned from considering these goods and their distribution can be applied to other kinds of goods.

The Paleolithic paintings and drawings found on cave walls at sites in France and Spain, such as Lascaux, Altamira and Vallon-Pont-D’Arc, have profound effects they have on those who see them. In addition to their historical interest, they are prized for their aesthetic and spiritual qualities, which have had an important influence on modern art. But the caves are small and the paintings are fragile. Access to them has been sharply limited: some caves have been closed to protect the paintings from the damage caused by human respiration; access to others is limited to those who negotiate a daunting reservation scheme. Despite being the heritage of humanity as a whole, the cave paintings are, and must be, restricted to a very few. Not everyone who wants to see the paintings can do so if they are to survive.

How many other goods are like this? There are many unique sites around the world that, while perhaps not quite so fragile, seem to be scarce in a similar way: unfettered access to them would destroy their value. Some are natural: the Grand Canyon, for instance. Others are artificial: historically significant buildings, such as Notre Dame, cities, such as Florence, or art objects, such as

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the Mona Lisa. Some events, such as performances, also seem to be scarce in the relevant way. The value of experiencing these things is significantly compromised when they are enjoyed by too many other people. Sometimes, this is due to physical damage: fragile ecological systems may be unable to recover from overuse. In other cases, scarcity may be due to physical interference: one cannot experience the majesty of the Grand Canyon, hear the aria, or calmly reflect on the painting when crowded by too many other people. Sometimes what is lost is the authenticity of a practice or social institution. Cathedrals crowded with non-practicing observers are museums and cities given over to tourism may cease to be living municipalities with real permanent residents.

In this paper, we will characterize both the value that these goods are thought to have and the sense in which they are intrinsically scarce. We will also propose some principles in regard to the distribution of access to them. Finally, we will suggest that the lessons learned from considering these goods and their distribution can be applied to a broader range of goods than one might expect.

CHARACTERIZATION

We have a set of examples of goods that seem to be scarce in a similar way. How can this scarcity be characterized and what distinguishes these goods from other scarce goods? Their scarcity is not due to their being destroyed in consumption: in principle, an indefinite number of people could enjoy the goods we have in mind. Nor are these goods scarce as a matter of logical necessity: unlike other necessarily scarce goods, one need not have exclusive possession of these goods in order to enjoy them at all.
First, our goods are, generally speaking, available for widespread consumption in the sense that an indefinite number of people can enjoy them. They are not necessarily destroyed when they are enjoyed. Any item of food, by contrast, is ‘scarce’ inasmuch as it can be consumed only by a limited number of people. The point of the goods we have in mind, however, is to experience them and this is compatible with leaving them as they are. The Grand Canyon, for example, can by enjoyed by an indefinitely large number of people. Even the very fragile cave paintings could, in principle, be enjoyed more widely than they currently are. It may be possible in the future, for example, to outfit visitors with masks that retain exhaled carbon dioxide and to use lighting that will allow the paintings to be seen without causing them to fade.

However, these goods are vulnerable to at least two kinds of destructive use, which we will call degradation and dilution. A good is degraded when it is damaged or destroyed by overuse. Given current technology, the cave paintings and Grand Canyon are subject to degradation by overuse. Different things may be degraded in different ways: carbon dioxide degrades cave paintings but sustains rain forests. Loud singing would degrade a performance of Hamlet but is necessary for a proper celebration of Oktoberfest. Degradation need not be physical. The buildings in a famous city may still stand while even though it largely serves tourists rather than functioning as a city in which people live. In this kind of case, what is degraded are social institutions and practices: the physical buildings in such a city may even be better preserved than they otherwise would be in order to attract tourists who prefer ancient authenticity to modern convenience. As the example shows, degradation is not always a simple matter. The social practices that sustain a living city may be degraded while its physically buildings are exquisitely preserved and *vice versa*. It may
thus be practically impossible to prevent all kinds of degradation at the same
time.

A good is *diluted* when overuse undermines the valuable experience of it. Valuable experiences are thus distinct from the *basis* of the experience, that is, the thing that is experienced, in that the one can be harmed even when the other is not. The Mona Lisa is not damaged if too many people crowd around it. The actors, scenery, and text of a play are no worse for wear even if the ambient noise of an overly large audience makes it difficult to follow the performance. The Grand Canyon is large enough to accommodate an astonishing number of people without bearing any noticeable physical damage. As a general matter, the threshold at which valuable experiences are diluted is far lower than the point at which the bases of those experiences are damaged by overuse.

Degradation and dilution are similar in several ways. First, both are matters of degree: just as the basis of an experience can be obliterated or merely nicked overuse may make an experience impossible or merely present an annoyance. Second, different valuable experiences are diluted in different ways, much as different bases are degraded in different ways. Any experience that involves reflective, unmediated contemplation will be quite sensitive to the presence of others, with solitary meditation being an obvious extreme. But some goods cannot be experienced in private at all: it would be extremely odd to be the sole person viewing an opera or rock show and someone who wants to celebrate Oktoberfest alone or experience Venice devoid of people would really have missed the point. One difference between degradation and dilution is that dilution is significantly more sensitive to subjective factors. The question of whether a painting has suffered physical damage is a fairly
straightforward objective matter whereas whether an experience has been
diluted or not turns on facts about the person having it. The average viewer
does not really need to be alone with a great painting in order to have a calm,
reflective experience of it. An artist seeking who wants to study the painting in
great detail, however, might need solitude, such that her experience of the
painting is diluted much more easily than the casual observer’s is. One might
simply wish to see the great painting for purely social reasons. When in Paris,
one sees the Mona Lisa and failing to do so would leave some people feeling as
though their trip had been incomplete. For them, even a dense throng would
not undermine the desired experience. Finally, different people may desire
different experiences from the same scarce basis. Non-believers who wish to
visit a great cathedral seek different experiences than those who wish to use it
for worship. Too many tourists may distract a worshipper from the desired
religious experience but a cathedral with too few visitors may lapse into
disrepair. Conversely, the tourist loses what he wants if worship is impossible;
there is a difference between visiting a cathedral and visiting a museum.

There is something paradoxical about overuse, that is, the use which causes
degradation or dilution. Isn’t it self-defeating to pursue an experience in a way
that undermines either the experience itself or its basis and, if so, why do
people do it? The phenomenon, however, is genuine and can be explained in
various ways. One factor at play is the familiar tragedy of the commons: each
additional person’s use of a common resource is of greater value to her than

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2 The contrast may be less strict than the text suggests since what physical changes count
as damage may depend on subjective factors as well. A painting may have lost hundreds or
even thousands of molecules without being noticeably different to beings with our perceptual
abilities. For us, it would not have been damaged at all even if it might appear gouged to a
being with more acute perceptual abilities or to a particularly meticulous restorer. The Grand
not using it, even if it lowers the value of the resource to all users, and consequently additional people may continue to use the resource until it is largely destroyed. Another factor concerns conflicting aims. If enough people want to see a painting like the Mona Lisa simply because they regard doing so as an important part of a trip to Paris—something they want to be able to say they have done—the painting will be mobbed. Those mobbing the painting will not necessarily suffer any frustration: they are getting pretty much what they wanted. But they will frustrate those who want an opportunity to contemplate the painting. They will, presumably, stay away from the painting altogether. This is what someone who raises the skeptical question at the beginning of the paragraph would predict, but it does not have the effect of preserving the good in question since the peaceful contemplation it requires is not thereby made available.

A second contrasting case are goods whose value depends, at least in part, on the fact that one possesses them while others do not. Winning first prize in a race is a good only if someone else ran second. The enjoyment of a certain kind of music establishes one’s especially refined or cool sensibilities only if it is not shared by the mainstream. The ways in which we value personal relationships are determined to a large degree by their restriction to a very few people: being loved by someone is valuable in part because that person does not love everyone in the same way. The value of the goods we are describing, however, does not depend on any sort of exclusivity: exclusivity is not an intrinsic feature of these goods in the way that it is an intrinsic feature of a prize in a competition. My experience of the Grand Canyon is not impaired

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Canyon may lose tons of material in a year and remain exactly the same basis of valuable experiences.
simply because others enjoy it as well. It is logically possible that thousands of people might look out over the Grand Canyon from the same point while all experiencing the splendor and awe of standing alone amidst natural beauty: they might have devices that cancel the sound and sight of one another, for example. This is, of course, technologically impossible now, but it might be possible at some point. By contrast, there is no technological means of distributing a competitive good more widely. There is no value to winning a race if everyone ties for first; they might as well have all tied for last.

So by intrinsically scarce goods we mean ones which are not scarce as a matter of conceptual necessity, like being the world's fastest sprinter, but because of their contingent physical features. However, it is also distinctive of these goods, though it is hard to put the point with precision, that their scarcity is not easily remedied and, in this respect, they are different from other goods. If ordinary consumer goods are scarce, market forces will generally see to it that more are manufactured. If the necessities of life are scarce, social institutions such as governments are charged with providing them. With the goods we have in mind, however, the right response to scarcity cannot be increased supply, but only intelligent management and distribution.

One reason for this is that the value of these intrinsically scarce goods rests in part in their being rare or authentic, and what we desire is unmediated experience of them. It is perhaps partly for this reason that most of the obvious examples of the kind of goods we are interested in are ‘high culture’ ones, such as paintings and opera performances. Many pop culture goods are not subject to degradation or dilution to the same extent or even at all. There is no real limit to how many people can enjoy the same movie or TV show. These are indefinitely reproducible such that there is no distinction between
experiencing the original and experiencing a copy: either is the same movie. Moreover, many pop cultural goods are what one might call anti-competitive insofar as their value is enhanced by widespread consumption: part of the reason for watching the American Superbowl or a Quebeois téléroman is to participate in an experience shared by the whole community. Even when a pop cultural good is not reproducible in these ways, the thresholds of degradation and dilution will be quite high: a Rolling Stones concert designed for a stadium is more robust than a solo Chopin recital. Nonetheless, it is not the case that authenticity and intimacy never matter for so-called 'low culture' goods: classical music is not the only kind enhanced by smaller scale performances. So while our examples tend towards the high cultural and the concerns of tourists we are not concerned with them as such. Rather, our interest is in goods which have the features we have noted.

To summarize: there are goods that are intrinsically scarce in that (a) they are neither logically scarce nor naturally consumed but are subject to dilution or degradation by overuse and (b) overuse would be the likely or certain result of free and unfettered public access to them. The central cases of such goods are those giving rise to aesthetic or spiritual experiences which depend on unmediated access to their authentic or otherwise special aesthetic features.

DISTRIBUTION

In this section, we will argue that there are important questions concerning the distribution of access to these scarce goods. We will then describe some of the strategies used to distribute access and argue for a particular way of justifying the authority to make distributive decisions. The next section will apply these lessons to other, more controversial, cases.
There are important questions about the distribution of access to intrinsically scarce goods. In principle, a wide range of distributive strategies are possible. One might, for example, allow unrestricted access to intrinsically scarce goods and accept their subsequent degradation or dilution. On the other extreme, one might cloister the goods, cutting off all access to them in the name of preservation, as has been done with the cave paintings at Lascaux. In the vast majority of cases, however, these strategies will strike most of us as inappropriate. Many intrinsically scarce goods are widely regarded as an important part of the human heritage whose loss would be significant. Cloistering is a desperate short term strategy and rarely makes sense as a permanent policy: what is the point of preserving something that can never be seen or used? If access is to be permitted while the goods are to be preserved, it will have to be restricted and that forces us to consider its proper distribution.

That said, there are ways of postponing distributive questions by channeling demand to alternatives. Ersatzing, diverting demand from the authentic good to copies, is one such strategy. For example, facsimiles of the cave paintings have been made available at ‘Lascaux II’, a strategy also copied at cave sites which allow some restricted public access. Broadcasting, giving broader mediated access to supplement narrow, immediate access, has a similar aim. Televising papal masses and distributing images of rare books over the internet are two examples of broadcasting. Ersatzing, broadcasting, and other ways of alleviating the tendency towards overconsumption should, no doubt, be pursued. But they are unlikely to displace the need to restrict access altogether because they cannot deliver the unmediated experience that is the goods’ most prized feature. As long as there is great value in having direct, unmediated access to a unique good it is likely that access to the good will have
to be restricted. Thus, distributive questions are, for all practical purposes, inevitable.

What is needed are distributive mechanisms that preserve intrinsically scarce goods. Two general characteristics of such mechanisms follow from our analysis of the nature of these goods: they restrict access to the goods so that they are not degraded or diluted by overconsumption and they display a bias towards those who appreciate the unmediated, authentic experience of the goods and against those who desire access for other reasons. There are three reasons for such a bias. First, the immediate experience of the goods is what is especially scarce; mediated experiences can be provided through alternative means such as ersatzing and broadcasting. Second, the value of the unmediated, authentic experience is, in general, greater than the value derived from other ways of experiencing the goods. Third, restricting access to those who best appreciate what is precious about the goods has instrumental value in that such people are more likely to be especially careful to avoid both degrading the good itself or unnecessarily diluting others’ experiences.

Insofar as they are subject to overconsumption, it is not surprising that access to many intrinsically scarce goods is, as a matter of fact, restricted. One simple way of restricting access is to put up barriers that select for those most committed to experiencing the good. Attaching a financial price to access is one obvious kind of barrier. Elaborate queuing or application procedures perform a similar function even if access is very inexpensive. For example, the cost of access to national parks, such as Etosha reserve in Namibia, is often low relative to what the market would bear, but the procedures for gaining access are cumbersome and require effort. Thus a first-come-first-served policy can still selective for those with enough genuine interest to persist
despite the bureaucratic hurdles. Barriers have the advantage of limiting access and providing a simple way of distributing access. However, the ability to overcome either kind of barrier is, at best, an inexact measure of genuine appreciation of a good. The ability to spend money is, notoriously, a poor indicator of genuine interest as it is so unevenly distributed. Time barriers are a little better but also imperfect. Ticket scalpers can frustrate attempts to restrict access to those willing to wait in line and travel agencies can learn the tricks to getting access to the game park. In other words, time barriers are in practice often converted into financial ones, and thus sometimes have the same disadvantages.

A second, more selective, distributive mechanism is to favor in-groups. In-groups are sometimes communal. A religious institution, for example, may give preferential access to its architectural treasures to its members, and indigenous peoples do the same for access to traditional lands under their control. Membership in an in-group may also be based on qualification. Music students may be given specially subsidized tickets to the opera, for example. One extreme case is the British National Gallery’s practice of giving a few distinguished artists keys to the building, so that they can visit in solitude at any time for an undiluted experience. Interestingly, the bias in favor of in-groups is rarely exclusive. Most religious institutions allow non-believers access to places of worship, for example, and opera tickets are subsidized for everyone insofar as the production companies almost always have public support.

Given the diversity of intrinsically scarce goods, it is unlikely that we will find general principles sufficiently robust to determine their proper distribution. Even if one grants that access should be distributed so as to
preserve the goods without damage, many questions remain as to how, exactly, this is to be done. For that reason, distributive questions will typically be resolved by a distributive authority: a person or institution with the right to distribute access to a good. But what is the right model for such an authority? Private distributive authority is based on ownership: the fact that I own this watch gives me authority to distribute access to the watch. Public distributive authority is based on political legitimacy: the fact that political institutions are democratic or just gives them the authority to issue laws. For the purposes of thinking about distributive authority over intrinsically scarce goods, we propose a third model: custodianship. A good custodian has both expert knowledge about and a commitment to preserving an intrinsically scarce good. Like private owners, custodians claim authority to decide distributive questions without public review and without necessarily taking the common good as a whole into account. Like political institutions, custodians are not guided by private interests. Rather, they are guided by a commitment to preserve the good in question.

Our identification of these goods as public and part of the common human heritage may seem already to imply a commitment to state ownership and distribution in the public interest. But many are, in fact, either in private hands or those of a non-governmental institution. Perhaps Paleolithic cave sites should be expropriated from private owners. But these represent an extreme case and few would argue for the moral necessity of expropriating all great paintings from private hands, much less that the state should govern access to cathedrals and churches. The real question, we suggest, is not whether distributive authority over a given intrinsically scarce good should be public or private, but rather whether a putative authority will be a good custodian.
The best custodians of a given good are characterized by three features. First, they are best *qualified* to appreciate and understand the good. It is hard to imagine how a custodian could reliably preserve a good that it did not understand and value. Second, they are *committed* to the good’s preservation. Third, they are sufficiently self-sustaining and *persistent* to be able to ensure the long-term preservation of the good. Since a reason for worrying about the distribution of intrinsically scarce goods is to preserve them for future generations, one crucial requirement of custodianship is permanence.

Several qualities seem to be correlated with good custodianship. One is resistance to market forces. It is possible that a good custodian will seek to maximize the profit derived from an intrinsically scarce good. Those who view intrinsically scarce goods largely as instruments for generating wealth would have strong incentives for learning about them and preserving them in some ways. But we think that good custodians who seek to maximize financial return from a good will be extremely rare. Among other things, the profit to be maximized is generally the profit to be realized by present owners and this likely to be incompatible with the long term preservation of the good. While many intrinsically scarce goods are in private hands, few are in the hands of owners who are driven by market forces, such as publicly traded companies that are responsible for maximizing profits for their shareholders.

This is not to reject market mechanisms as a way of distributing access to goods. On the contrary, the barriers we mentioned earlier are such a mechanism and, while imperfect, they are not necessarily inappropriate. For example, most opera houses have ticket prices sufficiently high to act as a restriction on access and this seems uncontroversial, though there is plenty of dispute in particular cases as to the correct balance between the public
subsidies they enjoy and the portion of their costs that they recover from their users. What we are dubious about is overly economic motivations on the part of the custodians. Even opera houses do not auction off their seats to the highest bidder and they often give preference to long-term subscribers, or early buyers, music students or students generally. Similarly, the National Gallery’s policy of giving keys to artists strikes us as charming idea, whereas we would find it distressing if it gave keys to the largest donors.

Conversely, good custodian tend to insulated from public pressure. Political institutions, for example, are answerable to the public at large and, as such, face pressure to allow greater access to intrinsically scarce goods than is compatible with their long term preservation. This is the case with national parks in the United States, for example: they have extensive systems of roads even though these are incompatible with experiencing the natural beauty of the park and encourage overuse.

A third quality correlated with good custodianship is a sympathetic historical association with an intrinsically scarce good. The Catholic church, for example, has proven to be a good custodian of its architectural treasures. Old English families are entrusted as custodians of country houses. The increasing trend towards recognizing the rights of indigenous people over their traditional ecological and cultural heritage is, among other things, a recognition of their custodian qualifications. Communities or groups that have an antagonistic historical association with a good, on the other hand, are likely to be poor custodians. The Taliban, for example, were bad custodians of the Bamiyan Buddhas not because the religious sect they represented lacked historical roots but because they were hostile to the community that had built them.
There may be conflicting claims to custodianship. There may, for example, be potential custodians who have a traditional association with a good—inheritors of a great estate or native people of an ecosystem—competing with those who have superior technical knowledge or power such as academic experts or the state. A traditional pastoral people who might have been excellent custodians of an ecosystem one hundred years ago might need new outside expertise to protect and manage access to it under contemporary conditions. The best rule in conflicts is, we suggest, King Solomon’s: custodianship belongs to whoever is most reliably motivated to preserve the good. The rule suggests that conflicts like that sketched above would tend to be resolved naturally: a traditional custodian genuinely committed to preserving a good would also be willing to acquire and use technical expertise even if it comes from outsiders who are not traditionally associated with it. In any case, the public interest is served by the authority of a reliable institutional tradition of commitment to valuation of the good, wherever it may be found. In many cases, the most plausible locale for a custodianship culture will be some ‘third way’ institution belonging neither to the marketplace nor to the state: aboriginal authorities, religious institutions, not-for-profit cultural foundations. But a vigorous and stable custodianship culture might also be found in a private-sector corporation (one resistant to the allure of short-term profit maximization) or a ministry of government (one resistant to public pressures for access). The point of ‘King Solomon’s Rule’ is that the claim of either the state or the private sector to custodianship must

3 Why not instead say: ‘to whoever will maximize efficient distribution over the long term’? The two should come to the same thing; but custodians should err on side of caution and prioritize preservation, since degradation typically cannot be reversed.
not be *ex officio* or *a priori*, but must rest on the quality of the custodianship regime it can provide in the particular case.

In sum, a wide range of distribution strategies seems to be acceptable. The key features of a satisfactory distribution regime seem to be as follows:

- Distributive authority is in the hands of recognized custodians.
- The custodian body is committed to the good itself, thus motivated to preserve it and distribute it accordingly. It is also expert, or harnesses the expertise of others, and capable of extending its protection of the good into the future.
- Dilution and degradation are prevented by using ersatzing and broadcasting where possible and appropriate selection mechanisms otherwise. Those mechanisms include both effective barriers to access and preferential access for any relevant in-group.

MORE CONTROVERSIAL CASES

The goods we have considered have the common characteristic of being somewhat at a remove from economic fray: their value is largely spiritual and aesthetic. While one might make money from them, no one’s most vital economic needs or rights are involved and the fate of nations does not hang on their disposition. For that reason, they are not typically the subject of ideological wrangling. Free marketeers have not tended to write diatribes against the expropriation of cave sites and socialists have had more important things to nationalize than country houses. So perhaps the pragmatic and intuitive reasoning which seems to come naturally in considering intrinsically
scarce goods may afford some clarity that will help in thinking about a range of similar, but more controversial cases.

One such case concerns diffuse cultural goods such as those found in great cities. These are not just a matter of physical things such as buildings but of the complex social structures that they contain. By virtue of historical associations, knowledge, and commitment, the current residents and their elected representatives are most often best placed to act as custodians of urban social systems. This provides an argument for allocating greater political power to local political institutions than might otherwise seem plausible. So, for example, seen as custodians, a local government might have the right, and indeed the responsibility, to establish barriers to access. Florence and Venice are part of world’s cultural heritage, but are, notoriously, vulnerable to overuse. A case can be made that a suitably motivated Florentine or Venetian governments should have the power to limit access to their cities, preserving both their physical infrastructure and their authenticity as working cities against degradation and dilution. Doing so may be necessary to preserve the good that people come to see—the great cities—rather than an ersatz replacement that is sadly historically continuous with the original. Moreover, rent control can be seen as a legitimate form of preferential access: it is a way of selecting an in-group of long-term residents who have a special commitment to the value of their city. When the intrinsically scarce good of a particular vibrant urban culture is at stake and a municipal government exercises its custodial judgment that rent control is necessary to preserve it, there is a strong presumption that higher levels of government ought to respect that custodial judgment and not override the law.
A second case concerns higher education. A university education is an intrinsically scarce good since the classroom and campus experiences are subject to dilution. Academic self-government is a classic case of custodianship based on the special knowledge and values of the custodians. These custodians distribute higher education on the basis of their judgments of merit, selecting a relevant in-group constituted by academic ability. Even private universities admit students, for the most part, on the basis of academic talent and ability to make most of the experience: they do not typically auction off places to the highest bidders nor are spots at public universities regarded as the spoils of electoral victory. At the same time, the status of academics as custodians provides an argument against political interference in university admissions and administration: efforts to expand a university’s size beyond what its custodians deem wise or to alter admissions policies are, for that reason, presumptively inappropriate.

In both cases, our account of custodianship and intrinsically scarce goods gives an argument in favor of leaving custodial authority free from outside interference. At the same time, they point to some limitations of our argument. In particular, we have not discussed comparisons among goods. Municipal or academic custodians may have authority over the appropriate distribution of their particular goods. But they have no special authority over

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4 This is not to deny that preference is sometimes given to members of groups whose qualifications seem of more dubious relevance: children of graduates, the wealthy, and athletes. Worse, in the past, many of the most prestigious American universities discriminated against women and Jews, for example, for a scandalously long time. This shows, rather dramatically, that custodians, like other distributive authorities, are not perfect and that they may make extremely bad distributive decisions. It could be argued, indeed, that a key feature of an acceptable custodianship regime is a capacity for self-criticism and self-correction—the capacity to recognize which aspects of the current distributive regime do not genuinely serve the interests of its good. An acceptably governed university will gradually adopt a more
how to balance their goods against competing goals. If a country faces a severe housing crisis that is exacerbated by rent control, for example, it may be the case that a city’s distinctive culture ought to be sacrificed for the sake of providing housing. Similarly, if social justice demands that university education be extended more broadly than academic custodians have allowed, it is possible that their decisions should be overridden. Our argument is of the form “if good $G$ ought to be preserved, then custodian $C$ ought to govern its distribution.” It does not show anything about the value of $G$ compared to that of other goods. Our presumption is that the intrinsically scarce goods we have mentioned should be preserved, even at non-negligible cost. But we have not given an argument to that effect nor have we shown how such decisions ought to be made.

enlightened admissions policy; a zoo or game park is in the hands of good custodians if the living conditions of the animals continues to improve.