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## On Cultural Markets

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## ON CULTURAL MARKETS

**D**EFINING CULTURAL hegemony is no simple task. To feel culturally dominated evokes deep fears and uncertainties; but even those who express these feelings are not clear what they are. By comparison, military hegemony is far less problematic: here, domination merely requires the ability to annihilate one's nearest competitors. It is a daunting but not a complex undertaking—a question of counting up the nuclear missiles, ships and planes, and being prepared to use them. A militarily dominant country may not win every time—morale, geography and public opinion do matter—but it never loses. Hegemony in this field is a matter of state policy, economic resources and technological know-how. Patriotism and a sense of being under threat are further requirements but these are not too hard to engineer; most countries succeed without difficulty. It is even easier if you have some achievements to be proud of and are worried about forfeiting them.

Cultural hegemony is made of different stuff. States do not decide to become culturally dominant; nor is it clear what this might entail since cultures, however defined, are not coterminous with 'states' or even 'nations'—they develop on the basis of widespread borrowing, adaptation, imitation, and are endlessly redefined. States, of course, often favour this or that cultural activity, and give support to their theatres, writers, musicians or film-makers. These, however, are often defensive measures, aimed at ensuring a wider audience for what are regarded as the country's finest artefacts, or protecting what is arbitrarily regarded as the national culture—one artificial construct against others. In so far as culture is also a productive activity, the instruments at a state's disposal are largely economic: subsidies, protectionism, quotas. This does not amount to much, or not enough to increase the cultural power at the

nation's disposal which, by and large, accrues almost spontaneously—a by-product of economic power, prestige, influence, history and chance.

Global or regional cultural domination entails exporting one's cultural products, which usually have—in the minds of both exporters and importers—a clear national origin. In the nineteenth century France and Britain, culturally dominant in the field of narrative, imported very little, and that mostly from each other. Today the US imports remarkably few films and television programmes, relative to its consumption, and many of those they do buy in have been consciously designed to satisfy American audiences. This is a crucial sign: other people watching *your* films, reading *your* books, listening to *your* music, going to *your* plays, and imitating them, while you know nothing of theirs.<sup>1</sup>

To achieve this kind of dominance it is necessary, though not sufficient, to possess, in vast quantities, the means to produce and diffuse cultural commodities: publishers for books and music; a strong press; a film industry that includes a distribution network; a music industry; radio and television studios; numerous venues for live performances, and so forth. It is also necessary to have a strong domestic market for, with very few exceptions, the export of cultural commodities is a by-product of a thriving home industry. This is where costs are covered and initial profits made; gains from abroad are a bonus. Some countries have a strong domestic market for certain of their cultural products but are not able to export in significant quantities. The Indian film industry, for example, is, in terms of production, the largest in the world, but its penetration of foreign markets is relatively modest and still confined, overwhelmingly, to Indian communities abroad. Japanese animation has a significant presence in the rest of the world but this tends to be a niche market, specifically earmarked for penetration; the 'Japanese' content of such films is kept to a minimum, while much of their inspiration comes from the West. Animation's success also has no counterpart among the other Japanese cultural industries—popular music, narrative, cinema—whose products may have great appeal locally but get scant showing elsewhere.

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<sup>1</sup> The fine arts should be left out of this analysis. Though these unmistakably form a market, it is either one based on production for the specific individual or institution that offers the commission, or is a highly speculative retail market in non-reproducible commodities.

What follow, then, are brief notes towards an initial way of understanding the positions states can occupy in the hierarchy of cultural power. Though the possible combinations are numerous and complex, we might propose an initial set of characterizations:

- ▶ Culturally dominant states: abundant local production which meets the demands of a strong domestic market as well as those from abroad; imports are low. Examples: Britain and France in the nineteenth century; the US since 1945.
- ▶ Protectionist states: may have a strong domestic cultural market but are unable to export, and prevent imports. Example: the USSR.
- ▶ States whose domestic cultural market absorbs both local and foreign production, but which are unable to export significantly. Examples: Japan; India.
- ▶ Culturally dominated states: what they consume originates mainly from abroad. Examples: Belgium; Bulgaria.

### *Burgeoning audiences*

Do these suggestions permit us to map out the contours of cultural hegemony in the nineteenth century, and to make some preliminary indication of the basis for US dominance, in the twentieth? To do so, we need to think of culture in economic terms, producing commodities to be bought and sold. In the nineteenth century these fall into two categories. Firstly, 'recorded' products embedded in a physical item that can be purchased, or hired out, and individually consumed: texts (books, newspapers), prints, illustrated texts (magazines, picture books) and 'recorded' music.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, products which, for their consumption, require the physical presence of purchasers at a venue where the performance takes place. Here, consumption is collective and the product, strictly speaking, unique, since no two performances of even the same spectacle—at the theatre, the opera, the variety show, the *café concert*—can be identical.

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<sup>2</sup> In the nineteenth century, recorded culture was fundamentally printed culture. This included music which, in the Western tradition at least, can be notated, enabling consumers to purchase both sheet music and instruments for private or public performance.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the markets for both recorded cultural goods and performance were in constant expansion, reflecting the increasing size of markets in general. There were, however, specific causes for the growth of cultural markets: a large middle class with plenty of leisure time; technological improvements that made books cheaper (and sheet music too, through lithography); a thriving press, and literary journals that provided serialized fiction; an efficient lending-library system. The expansion of education provided a powerful, often state-backed, market for school texts. The real French best sellers of the nineteenth century were not Dumas or Verne but works such as Larive's and Fleury's grammar primer, which sold a million copies between 1882 and 1883 alone, twelve million between 1872 and 1889, and twenty-six million by 1920. Other factors would include the linguistic unification of a number of European nation-states, which enlarged the markets for printed texts.

Performance culture underwent a parallel transformation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, even in bourgeois countries such as Britain and France, performance was still largely constrained within a pre-modern framework. Itinerant players staged shows at determinate times, coinciding with a religious calendar. Music was provided outside the market, at church services or in aristocratic homes. Opera houses were social venues for the dominant classes, subsidized by courts and patrons. Theatres were rigidly regulated and restricted. There were musical markets—concert performance on a commercial basis—in some of the main capital cities, notably London; but these were still underdeveloped.

From around the mid-century, there then occurred a remarkable burst of growth. Concert halls and opera houses were built, or expanded and redesigned to accommodate a wider public. The old pre-market system of patronage entered into crisis. The new bourgeois consumers paid attention to what was actually on offer: it was the birth of the 'listening audience'. Their preferences were key elements in the formation of a rapidly developing commercial system. As it paid to give the audiences what they wanted, the profit motive expanded its aesthetic reach—to the alarm of intellectual elites who complained about the 'industrialization' of culture (Arnold, Carlyle, Sainte-Beuve).

A culture of adaptation across genres came into being. Theatrical and opera-house managements demanded successful shows. The dominance

of print made itself felt in performance culture: theatrical plays were increasingly based on successful novels, operas on novels and plays; they virtually never had original, specially commissioned plots. Almost the entire opus of nineteenth-century opera consisted of adaptations of material already successful in print or on the stage. As operas were 'sold' on a global market it was preferable to adapt internationally consecrated material: the work of Walter Scott, the most successful novelist of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, provided the plots for almost a hundred. Of the twenty-two operas composed by Giuseppe Verdi after the successes of *Nabucco* and *I Lombardi alla Prima Crociata* in the early 1840s, nine were adaptations of French texts, six of German plays (five by Schiller), five of English plays (three by Shakespeare) and two of Spanish plays. Italians may have been dominant but, conscious of the international nature of the opera market, they refrained from using specifically Italian settings and themes. It is as if almost the entire production of Hollywood had been based on European stories, by European writers, and set in Europe.

Triumph in a hegemonic country was the royal road to global success. Consider the career of *Les Misérables*, Hugo's attempt to deploy some of the techniques of popular large-scale narrative that had proved so successful for Eugène Sue in his two serialized best sellers of the 1840s, *Les Mystères de Paris* and *Le Juif errant*. *Les Misérables* was first published in Brussels in 1862 and came out at the same time in Paris (Napoleon III dared not ban it), London, Leipzig, Rotterdam, Madrid, Milan, Turin, Naples, Warsaw, Pest, St. Petersburg and Rio de Janeiro. In 1910 it became one of the first 'long' (two-reel) cinematic adaptations by an American firm, the Biograph company, and has since been adapted at least twenty-six times for cinema and television. The musical version by Alain Boublil and Claude-Michel Schönberg that opened in London in 1985 had, by 2000, been performed in twenty-seven countries and sixteen languages.

### *Aesthetics of the safe bet*

The marketing logic of the opera was not substantially different from that of Hollywood. As production costs were high and failure could lead to bankruptcy—unlike publishing, where diversification of titles can help spread the risk—it pays to be cautious and to adapt what has been successful elsewhere. Hence the strong conservative element of all

market-oriented culture, which tends to repeat, with variations, what has worked before. Selling culture is, in this respect—as in several others—different from selling Coca-Cola. Those who like the drink want more of exactly what they had before. But those who like detective stories, romances or historical novels do not want to read the identical volume over and over again; they want a different yet similar book. The trick lies in getting the right variations. The marketing of cultural products consists in offering the public more of the same, but not exactly.

Market assumptions shaped cultural production in other ways: the duration of plays and operas, as later of films, was determined by prevailing views of a ‘proper’ length. Symphonies were never so restricted. Books can vary widely, though most today would fall somewhere between a hundred and a thousand pages—a ratio of one-to-ten, unthinkable for films. Lending libraries used to demand a multi-volume novel, so that more than one reader could be reading the same book at the same time. Serialization, and payment per line, dictated short chapters with plenty of dialogue and regular cliff-hangers—a procedure duplicated in the TV soap.

The successes of the nineteenth century provided a treasure-house of tested products for the technology-based cultural industries of the twentieth—cinema, music, radio and television. Many had been proved in more than one national market, the surest sign that the commodity could travel, could be adapted and enjoyed—and hence bought—by different people. The music market—where words matter little, if at all—was always particularly transnational. Itinerant musicians, whether operating in court genres or in popular ones, plied their trade throughout entire regions. In ‘high’ culture, the national market was so narrow that travelling became almost mandatory: its products have been tested across different countries since the Renaissance, at least.

The nineteenth century saw the birth of the international virtuoso: Paganini, Liszt and the great operatic divas. Music entered the market, thanks to the development of concert halls, the fall in sheet-music production costs and the wide-scale production of musical instruments, above all the piano. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, most concert music was composed for a particular occasion, and performed under the direction of the composer. But the cultural investment embodied in this duality did not necessarily require the latter’s presence. This

enabled what one might call the ‘triumph of dead composers’ in the leading music capitals of Europe—Paris, London, Vienna and the chief German cities. Mozart had died in 1791, Haydn in 1809 and Beethoven in 1827; but between 1828 and 1870, 60 per cent of the concerts performed at the Sociétés des Concerts du Conservatoire in Paris were of works by Beethoven (with 43 per cent of the total), Haydn and, then trailing behind, Mozart. The advance of the dead composers was relentless and swift. In the decade after 1815, 77 per cent of the works performed at the Leipzig *Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde* had been by living composers; between 1838 and 1848, their works were down to 53 per cent and, between 1849 and 1859, plummeted to 18 per cent. This increased the conservatism of serious-music consumption, while intensifying the competition facing living composers, who not only had to battle against each other but also with the dead. This, of course, was true for literature as well; but whereas very few people read the same novel again and again—thus necessitating a constant supply of new reading material—with music, enjoyment demands frequent listening.

### *Clarissa vs Werther*

The real take-off of the novel as a cultural commodity occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century (the genre, of course, had been of growing importance for a couple of centuries before). The required combination of market size, high literacy levels, prosperity, a developed lending-library system and a strong press ensured that the novel’s main consumer markets would be located in Britain, France and the German-speaking countries; but only France and Britain were dominant in its production. The German reading public—and particularly the aristocracy, which then dictated bourgeois taste—had, before 1800, accepted French and British cultural hegemony, especially in this sphere. Richardson’s *Clarissa* had been extremely influential throughout Europe, as was the Gothic genre and, later, Walter Scott. All of these were widely imitated. Yet the continental success of Goethe’s *Werther* did not spark a spate of German novels aimed at the European markets. During the nineteenth century—despite significant home production of both cheap and ‘high’ literature—Germany essentially produced novels for its own linguistic area, and imported the rest.

Other countries fared even worse. Russia’s novels and music only became known and admired in the rest of Europe towards the end of

the nineteenth century, once they had received the imprimatur of the two hegemons—with France in the lead. The Italians represent an interesting case. They dominated the operatic field—thanks in part to an exceptionally large home market: prior to unification, Italy had twice as many opera houses as France. Yet, as we have seen, they resorted to adaptations from foreign stories and used outside settings. Unlike Russia, Italy had at different times had, since the Renaissance, an important cultural lead in virtually all fields, although never simultaneously. Yet by the nineteenth century, outside opera, the country was not a major producer. The not-very-profitable genre of instrumental concert music was left to German domination; astonishingly, the country of Rossini, Donizetti, Bellini and Verdi—not to mention Monteverdi and Vivaldi—did not produce a single symphonic work worthy of note throughout the nineteenth century. The country whose *Commedia dell'arte* had had such a crucial impact on the development of European theatre did not produce a single popular or celebrated playwright.

Italy's great nineteenth-century European best seller was Collodi's *Pinocchio* (1881; first UK translation 1891), whose subsequent worldwide fame has probably been due to the Walt Disney cartoon of 1940. Children's literature, regarded as a low genre, could enable writers from non-hegemonic countries to achieve spectacular success: Hans Christian Andersen's stories, and the first woman Nobel prizewinner Selma Lagerlöf, from Sweden. The Americans were present on the European market with a few influential best sellers: the stories of Washington Irving, creator of Rip Van Winkle; James Fenimore Cooper's *Last of the Mohicans*; Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Otherwise, they too were importers—mainly of 'pirated' editions of British best sellers, such as Trollope and Dickens.

If the true hegemons in the field of narrative were the French and British, whose most popular works were gobbled up abroad and widely imitated, such success was still, of course, only the tip of an iceberg: hundreds of novels sank without a trace. This is true even of the giants of popular literature. *The Three Musketeers* and the *Count of Montecristo* are the survivors of what Franco Moretti has called a 'slaughterhouse of literature': Dumas had authored some four hundred books, of which less than twenty were exported, and only half a dozen are still widely read. The same goes for Jules Verne, author of fifty-four novels of which ten, at most, were internationally successful during his lifetime; only

three or four are still remembered outside France. In other words, export success rested on a ferocious selection process and a consequent recognition, not always well founded, that some countries and peoples were better than others at certain genres: a French or British historical novel; a British detective story or 'horror'; a French farce or melodrama, thanks to Eugène Scribe; a French operetta, due to Offenbach and his numerous Viennese followers; an Italian opera or song.

This amounts to branding, making it difficult for competitors of the 'wrong' nationality to emerge. The state of affairs endures. Those involved in the early Spaghetti Westerns—the cast included—Americanized their names, in the belief that no-one could possibly want to see a Western made by Italians. Nineteenth-century Italian publishers, conscious of the popularity of historical novels among the Italian French-speaking elites, would find it far less risky simply to translate a Dumas whose success had already been amply demonstrated than to commission a historical novel written by an Italian. As a result, Gramsci pointed out, the Italian reading public was far more familiar with French history, as seen by Dumas, than with their own. The contemporary parallels with US film and television production are obvious.

### *Adventures in translation*

Dumas's and Scott's output was still middle-class—or anyway, middle-brow—literature. Beneath this lay the galaxies of British penny dreadfuls, German *Trivialliteratur*, Russian *lubok* books, American dime novels—cheap stuff, sold by peddlars, despised by the educated; quite unexportable. But those who wrote it were readers of 'respectable' books; these, and the patrimony of stories they had inherited from folklore, mythology and previous popular and religious literature, constituted the sources of their inspiration. The most successful German novelist of the nineteenth century was Karl May, whose collected works sprawled across thirty-three volumes. Almost all were set in the American West. May, of course, had never been there, but he had read plenty of dime novels and he knew what his audiences wanted—a pattern Sergio Leone was to replicate a century later. Cheap literature played a role in diffusing successful genres into new markets.

Translations, and lack of respect for intellectual property, meant that foreign novels could be easily adapted, especially if they belonged to

'low' genres. The American detective novels featuring Nick Carter were very popular in Tsarist Russia at the turn of the century—their success enhanced by liberties taken on the part of the translators, to the extent that the Russian versions could no longer be regarded as entirely 'American'. In one novel, for instance, Nick Carter obtains the police files he has requested in five minutes; as no Russian reader could believe such a feat possible, the five minutes became, in translation, three weeks—much more in keeping with the celerity of the Tsarist bureaucracy. Such formulaic writing was, moreover, easily imitated; even in the US, Nick Carter had had a string of authors. After Russianizing a few, the translator soon picked up the formula and, while retaining the detective's identity and his American nationality, could make an NC novel even more palatable to Russian readers by setting it in Vladivostok, where Carter had gone to help out a friend, et cetera. Nick Carter also made it in Denmark and Sweden, where the first detective magazines were named after him and carried translations of his adventures; in Norway, in 1908, Nick Carter was transformed into the popular local detective Knut Gribb.

No single country was hegemonic in the nineteenth century throughout all cultural markets. The French and the British constituted a duopoly in narrative fiction, but this genre was less than 20 per cent of titles produced. In non-fiction the lead was narrower. Paris was unquestionably the world capital for opera, as Rossini and Verdi were well aware. Rossini moved there at the height of his fame, while Verdi only considered himself really successful when his *I Vespri Siciliani*—text by Scribe—was premiered in Paris. But the French grand opera was hegemonic only in France. The Italians were regarded as the masters, but the Germans, the French and the Russians were not far behind. The British were great consumers of music but not producers, the country being then regarded as the *Land ohne Musik*; Gilbert and Sullivan scarcely made it outside the English-speaking world. The Germans dominated the entire field of instrumental music, and carved an important place within the operatic sphere—Wagner and, for operetta, Johann Strauss. The French were certainly supreme in theatre, thanks above all to Scribe, Europe's most renowned playwright and author of four hundred and twenty-five plays—hardly any of which are performed today.

The technological revolution of the 1880s and 1890s altered the nature of cultural markets in a fundamental way. Sound and movement could

now be recorded and sold; voice and image, transmitted at a distance, could be consumed in one's own home. The most important technological developments, however, required major capital spending. The pattern of consumption changed. The public now had to purchase a piece of hardware—the gramophone, radio, television—in order to play, or tune into, software such as records or programmes. Cinema lowered, qualitatively, the cost of experiencing performance as collective consumption. The new industries of the twentieth century proceeded not so much by selling cultural goods as by selling the instruments whereby one could acquire them. With radio and television, the consumer had only one major economic decision to make: whether or not to buy the set. The motivation was the desire to listen to, or watch, programmes; but these cost nothing, or very little. Funding for cultural production was raised either through a state tax, by advertising, or via a mixture of the two. The record industry resembled publishing, except for the necessity of purchasing a gramophone. The cinema, like the theatre, was performance based; but the variations of a stage show—different actors, scenery, production—were eliminated. The cinema performance became a reproducible commodity.

It was at this stage that the United States began its slow but inexorable march towards supremacy in the cultural field. By the end of the First World War it had already become the dominant force in the gramophone and recording industry, although this only took off seriously in the 1920s. Quite unlike the nineteenth-century European publishing industry, it was, almost from its inception, an oligopoly dominated by five or six companies, of which three were American. The conception that animated the early recording industry could not have been farther from any idea of global cultural domination: it was simply assumed that there were distinct national cultures and that, in order to be successful worldwide—a necessity for large-scale enterprises—it was preferable to provide each culture with what it liked best. Accordingly, in 1902 the Gramophone Company—founded in London in 1898 by a group of British and American businessmen—sent one of its senior executives, Fred Gaisberg, to Asia to create a catalogue of native records. Gaisberg travelled to India, Burma, Siam, China and Japan, and recorded nearly 2,000 discs with local singers. He would set up his recording studio in a hotel room and, through agents, contact artists to come and sing and play. The Gramophone Company was not in the business of selling records: it wanted to market gramophones. Recording native music was

merely a means of motivating the local elites to buy the equipment. Cultural imperialism was better left to governments.

This is also why, in Europe, radio—and, later, television—manufacturers were happy to let governments have a monopoly on producing programmes of sufficient quality to get people to buy their sets. Thus the development of the most important European cultural industry of the twentieth century was based on a unique form of private-public partnership. Most of the music and literature consumed in Europe, between the wars, was European-produced. While some countries, Italy and France, for instance, consumed more of their own production than they imported from abroad—the present pattern in India and China—a growing share of what was imported came from the US. This was also, increasingly, the case for popular music, although Latin America and Italy remained major exporters, at least until the take-off of British music in the early 1960s. US supremacy in the cinema, however, had asserted itself by the 1920s. Before 1914 the French, Italians and Danes had dominated; once Hollywood became established, the majority of the films every European country imported were American. After the First World War, no European country managed to secure a major share of the international market. The main film-making countries—Germany, France, Britain—consumed their own films *and* American ones. The others were mere importers.

### *Dollarization of the ether*

By the end of the twentieth century—and here readers can make mental notes of the usual exceptions—the typical international best-selling novel, film, popular hit, and imported television programmes were American or American-inspired. This is not to say that everyone now consumes American culture; only that most of the culture that circulates *across national boundaries* originates in the US. Even in France, notoriously defensive about their cultural artefacts, American music has increasingly prevailed over French in the younger age groups; and much ‘French’ music has in reality been an adaptation or imitation of US models, down to the names—Johnny Halliday.

Why has the US become the largest exporter of culture? Or, to put it provocatively: why is American culture so superior? Part of the answer—a complex answer to a difficult question—lies, quite obviously, in the coun-

try's industrial capacity, prosperity and vast internal market; the scale of its corporations and the will of its administrations to help and nurture them. But this can only be part of the story. The rest may have to rely, for the time being, on a few hunches and leads. One is that, from the very beginning—that is, from the nineteenth century—the US regarded the production of culture as an industrial enterprise, to an extent unimaginable in Europe. It is true that, for instance, Alexandre Dumas had been a major cultural entrepreneur working within a highly commercialized system; but he addressed himself to what was still a relatively narrow middle class. Dumas was involved in craft production, while the American dime novel was produced on the assembly-line system before the assembly line was even invented. The Library of Congress has accumulated a collection of nearly 40,000 nineteenth-century dime-novel titles. Production was immediately industrial, authors becoming simply a cog in a complex marketing mechanism that included publishers, wholesale and retail distributors, advertisers and, of course, readers. The author 'Dumas' mattered, as a recognizable author. Dime-novel publishers—such as the legendary Irwin P. Beadle & Co., responsible for some 3,000 novels between 1860 and 1890—were themselves the brand name; people bought a Beadle novel, not a text by X or Y.

This is when the 'death of the author' was pioneered—in some instances, literally so. Take the case of Edward Wheeler, a Beadle author who wrote thirty-three novels with Deadwood Dick as a protagonist—and in which the character of Calamity Jane was introduced—before dying unexpectedly in 1885. The Beadle Company kept his death a secret and coached other writers to keep up a steady supply of Deadwood Dick novels, eventually producing a further ninety-seven, all signed 'Edward Wheeler'. A similar assembly-line production pattern was also achieved in popular music in the 1890s, just before the development of the recording industry and the spread of radio. This was the famous Tin Pan Alley—the name given to the stretch of 28th Street, between Broadway and Sixth, where most of New York's music-publishing business was concentrated, and where publishers hired lyricists and composers to mass-produce songs which were then promoted and sold, in those pre-recording days, as sheet music.

Another reason why US culture was so 'good' was that the original market in which it was tested—its own domestic market—was extremely complex and diversified, quite different from the traditional European

model. The American audience was an amalgam of people originating from different cultures. To be successful in France, one just had to please the French; in Italy, just the Italians. But to make it in the US one had to devise a product that would please, and delight, and be purchased by, the Irish and the Poles, Italians and Jews, Blacks and Germans, and so on. Hollywood's worldwide success in the era of silent movies arose from this home base. Franco Moretti has argued that the invention of sound put a temporary stop to this, elevating language into a powerful barrier which supported the take-off of the other national film industries. But with the invention of dubbing techniques, and then of the action movie, replacing words with 'sheer noise'—explosions, crashes, gunshots, screams—Hollywood soon regained its planetary dominance.<sup>3</sup> The key lay in the fact that, at the dawn of the industrial age in cultural production, the US domestic-consumer base was already culturally fragmented in a way that approximated the global one. The test once passed, the rewards were enormous: not only the conquest of a large market, but the possibility of conquering the world.

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<sup>3</sup> 'Planet Hollywood', NLR 9, May–June 2001.